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STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue on appeal is whether the lower court acted properly
by granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, thus denying Plaintiff uninsured motorist coverage under the automobile liability
policy issued by Defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
(1) No insurer shall refuse to renew a policy
unless this insurer or its agent shall mail or
deliver to the named insured, at the address
shown in the policy, at least thirty days' advance notice of his intention not to renew. This
section shall not apply:
***

(b)
Where there has been nonpayment
premium
Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-41-17.

of

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Godoy filed this action seeking a declaration of coverage
under an automobile liability policy issued by Defendant Mid-Century
Insurance Company for damages he sustained in an automobile accident
with John May, an allegedly uninsured motorist.

Defendant denied

Plaintiff's claim for coverage on the basis that the policy of
insurance had expired by its own terms two days before the accident
occurred and Plaintiff had failed to renew the policy by tendering
his premium payment.
-1-

Course of Proceedings and Disposition
Defendant Farmers Insurance Group was dismissed from the lawsuit
on September 3, 19 85. Although Defendant May was served with process,
no Answer was filed in his behalf.
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking
the Court to determine that Defendants owed a duty of coverage,
reserving the issues of bad faith and damages for trial. Defendants
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all issuers.

After a

hearing at which both sides presented oral argument, the Court granted
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Summary Judgment was

signed on June 9, 1987.

Statement of the Facts
Mr. Godoy obtained an automobile liability insurance policy
through Defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company.

The policy had an

effective date of November 7, 1983, and an expiration date of May 15,
1984.

(R. 178-191)

Premium payments were to be made by Mr. Godoy

each month. No premium payment was received from Mr. Godoy for April
or May, 1984, leaving an amount due of $40.12.

(R. 165, 261)

Defendants mailed to Plaintiff a "Notice of Cancellation — Nonpayment of Premium" which stated that the policy would terminate on
May 15, 1984, if full payment was not received.

(R. 203)

On May 17, 1984, two days following the expiration of Plaintiff's
policy, Mr. Godoy was involved in an automobile accident with John
L. May, an allegedly uninsured motorist. (R. 3) Mr. Godoy submitted
an application for no-fault personal injury protection benefits and
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uninsured motorist benefits to Mid-Century Insurance Company on
June 15, 1984.

(R. 159)

The Utah local office of Mid-Century

Insurance Company began receiving statements for medical expenses
incurred by Mr. Godoy and made its first payment for those expenses
on June 22, 1984. The local office of Defendant Mid-Century Insurance
Company issued six drafts totalling $1,082.00 for Mr. Godoy's medical
expenses until August 21, 1984. (R. 163-164) A draft was subsequently
issued on August 23, 1984, but a stop payment was placed on that
draft.

(R. 177)

Mr. Godoy and Lourdes Godoy, his wife, contend that a money
order for $18.00 was purchased won or about May 15, 1984," to pay
the premium, but have produced no documentary evidence that the money
order was purchased or mailed to the Defendants' address.
139)

Defendants have denied receiving any payment.

(R. 136-

(R. 261)

SUMMARY OF ARGOMENT
The district court properly denied Plaintiff' s motion for partial
summary judgment because there was no evidence that Defendant-insurer
had waived its right to terminate benefits under the policy of insurance.

The only action taken by Defendant following the expiration

of Plaintiff's policy was to pay six medical care providers over a
three-month period. Such action is not sufficient to create a waiver
of policy defenses and certainly not to reinstate a policy which has
lapsed. Mr. Godoy could not reasonably rely on the payments to the
medical care providers to reinstate his policy of insurance.
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The district court properly granted Defendant-insurer's motion
for summary judgment because the Plaintiff's policy expired by its
own terms two days before the automobile accident for which he is
claiming coverage.

It was not possible for Plaintiff to reinstate

coverage under the policy by merely mailing a one-month premium
payment "on or about" May 15, 1984, the expiration date of the policy.
A payment in excess of one month's premium had to be received on or
before that date to continue the policy in force to May 15, 19 84,
two days before the Plaintiff's accident.
The Plaintiff sought to compel additional discovery from Defendant.

The judge properly ruled that, under the state of the facts,

further discovery would not have benefitted Plaintiff in opposing
summary judgment.
Plaintiff further claims that Defendant-insurer acted in bad
faith in refusing to pay additional medical claims after making a
determination that the policy had lapsed prior to Plaintiff's accident. Since no policy of insurance existed at the time, the insurance
company could not act in bad faith.

Even if coverage had existed,

the insurance company acted promptly in paying the medical claims
and not unreasonably long in realizing its mistaken payment and
notifying Plaintiff of its denial of coverage.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
The Plaintiff is attempting to create coverage where none existed
at the time of his automobile accident.

The policy lapsed by its

own terms two days prior to the accident yet, in support of his
motion for partial summary judgment, the Plaintiff argued that the
Defendant insurance company waived its right to terminate benefits
under the automobile liability policy by making six payments for
Plaintiff's medical expenses over a three-month period following the
accident. Plaintiff did not cite one case in support of his contention
that payment of medical bills is sufficient to estop an insurance
company from subsequently denying benefits. Indeed, Larson v. Wycoff
Co., 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981), holds that such conduct by an insurer
does not create a waiver.
The Court in Larson, supra, considered the situation of an
employee whose benefits under the employer's insurance policy changed
when he moved from full-time status to part-time status. Following
the move, he submitted medical expense claims to the employer which
were paid over a short period of time. A final draft was issued to
cover the medical expenses but payment was later stopped. The Court
rejected the Plaintiff's claim of estoppel, citing the language in
Harding v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 83 Utah 376, 381, 28 P.2d
182, 184 (1934):
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It would be unjust to both the employee and the
insurance carrier if the law were that when the
insurance carrier once undertakes to provide
medical or other care for an injured workman it
has lost all right to afterwards defend against
what it believes to be an unjust or illegal claim.
See also; Morrison v. Droll, 588 P.2d 383 (Colo. App. 1978).
As in Larson, supra, Mr. Godoy, by his own admission, was aware
that a premium payment was necessary to maintain the policy in force
to its expiration date and that further payments would be necessary
to reinstate the policy after it lapsed.

The fact that the insurer

made payments for certain medical expenses over a very short period
of time did not in any way prejudice Mr. Godoy since payments were
made for "necessary medical expenses." Those expenses would presumably have been incurred regardless of the existence of insurance
coverage. Further, once the policy had expired, as explained below,
Mr. Godoy could not retroactively reinstate coverage for the loss
which occurred shortly after the policy had expired. Thus, Mr. Godoy
was aware that a payment needed to be made. He was not in the same
position as Mr. Larson, who claimed he was prejudiced because he was
unaware of a conversion option and was therefore uncible to take
advantage of that privilege on his medical insurance.

Mr. Godoy

cannot be said reasonably to have relied on the existence of insurance
coverage merely because of the medical payments made by Defendants.
While Defendant may not be entitled to repayment of the sums
it wrongly paid, it should not be estopped from denying that coverage
existed at the time of the accident.
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
THE DEPENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
A. NO COVERAGE EXISTED ON
THE DATE OP THE ACCIDENT
Even accepting Plaintiff's contention that he mailed a onemonth premium payment on or about May 15, 1984, the damages for which
he is claiming coverage were incurred after the insurance policy at
issue had expired by its own terms.

The policy and the Notice of

Cancellation state that the policy expired effective May 15, 19 84.
As stated above, Plaintiff owed a premium of $40.12. He is contending
that, at most, he mailed a premium payment of $18.00.

That action

would have been insufficient to keep the policy in force to its
stated expiration date and certainly would not have been sufficient
to reinstate the already lapsed coverage.
In order to continue coverage, payments must be received by an
insurer before the expiration date. In Kimball v. Kingsbury, 27 Utah
2d 70, 493 P.2d 300 (1972), the insured received a past-due notice
for premium payment and mailed a check to the insurance company.
The payment was post-marked the same day as an accident in which the
insured was involved. The payment was not received until three days
after the accident. The Court held that the payment was not timely
and there was no policy in effect at the time of the accident.
In the case of Pollock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 961
(10th Cir. 19 82), the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courtfs
judgment for the insurer, holding that a life insurance company could
deny coverage on the basis of the lapse of the policy for failure to
-7-

pay a premium even though the insurer had accepted a premium payment
following the lapse. In the present case, Mid-Century has no record
of even receiving the payment.
The Plaintiff has contended that because Defendant cannot disprove that he obtained the money order and mailed it to the Defendant,
Defendant is somehow admitting that it occurred.

Since Plaintiff

is unable to document the payment, it would be impossible for the
Defendant to do so. Defendant has denied receiving such a payment.
(R. 261)
The Court, in Butkovich v. Industrial Commission, 690 P.2d 257
(Colo. App. 1984), held that, absent an express agreement or course
of dealing to the contrary, mailing of an insurance premium was not
sufficient to constitute delivery where the Notice of Cancellation
expressly stated that the premium was to be received at the office
before the date of cancellation.

In the present case, there is no

express agreement or a course of dealing which would justify continuing the policy in force beyond its stated expiration dcite. Indeed,
both the policy and the notice state that the payment must be received
by the office on or before its due date.
Plaintiff's purported payment was not timely and not enough.
The Plaintiff has contended that he mailed the payment on or about
May 15, 19 84, the date the policy expired and two days before the
accident. Thus, the payment could have been mailed after the accident
occurred and certainly would not have been received before the policy
expired.

Regardless of when it was mailed, under the terms of the

Notice of Cancellation (R. 203) and the terms of the policy (R. 188),
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the payments had to be received, "on or before May 15, 19 84."

Mr.

Godoy did not accomplish this.
Plaintiff contends that he mailed a one-month premium payment,
"on or about May 15, 1984."

Merely mailing the payment after the

policy has lapsed would not continue the policy in force from the
date it terminated by its own terms. Mr. Godoy's only claim is that,
"on or about May 15, 19 84," he obtained a money order for partial
payment of the premium due, $18.00, which would not have been sufficient to reinstate the policy even if it had been timely received.
In the present case, the policy lapsed two days prior to the
accident involving Mr. Godoy.

The statutory framework on which

Plaintiff relies in his brief, Utah Code Annotated 31-41-15 and 3141-16 (1953), as amended, applies only to "cancellation" of a policy
and not to the failure to renew a policy, as in this case. There is
no statutory requirement for notice in the case of non-renewal if
there has been non-payment of premium, as in this case.

Utah Code

Annotated, Section 31-41-17.
It was not necessary for Defendant to mail a notice to Mr. Godoy
and it cannot be said that the notice in any way misrepresented the
state of the policy such that Mr. Godoy could reasonably have relied
on a continuation of the policy beyond the expiration date.
The Notice to Mr. Godoy specifically stated that the entire
payment for two months, $40.12, had to be received by Defendant on
or before May 15, 1984, or the policy would be cancelled effective
that date.

Plaintiff could not have complied with the Notice of

Cancellation or the policy provisions merely by mailing a money order
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in the amount of $18.00 to Defendant on or after May 15, 1984. Since
no payment was ever received by Defendant, no coverage existed on
the date of the accident.

B.
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY
WOULD NOT HAVE DEVELOPED AN
ISSUE OF MATERIAL PACT TO
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff has contended that Defendant's summary judgment should
not have been granted because discovery was not yet complete at the
time of hearing. The Plaintiff had filed a motion to compel additional
answers to discovery requests which had already been answered by the
Defendant.

That motion was heard at the same time as the cross-

motions for summary judgment.

At the time of that hearing, the

District Court Judge denied the motion to compel on the basis that
none of the information sought by Plaintiff was discoverable and,
further, even if the discovery was allowed, it would not change his
decision.
Even if the Plaintiff had been allowed to pursue additional
discovery, it would not have raised an issue of material fact to
preclude summary judgment.

In the present case, the policy had

lapsed even before the Plaintiff purportedly mailed his premium
payment and, as stated above, merely mailing the payment is not
sufficient to constitute delivery.

-10-

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS OF BAD FAITH ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The Defendant-insurer did not act in bad faith by denying
coverage. No policy of insurance existed at the time of the accident
for which Plaintiff claims coverage and, therefore, no duty existed
between Plaintiff and Defendant with regard to claims occurring after
the policy expired.

Further, Mid-Century Insurance Company did not

take an unreasonably long time to determine and advise Plaintiff
that his policy had lapsed prior to the automobile accident. Plaintiff
has made no allegations sufficient to sustain his claim of bad faith
against the Defendant.
The Utah Court, in the case of Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), set the standard for evaluating whether
an insurance carrier has acted in bad faith.

The carrier, at a

minimum, must act unreasonably in denying a claim.

In the present

case, there was no policy in force at either the time of the accident
or at the time of the denial of benefits.

The only possible act

which the Plaintiff could suggest was unreasonable is declining to
pay further benefits after a determination that no policy was in
force.

As explained above, it would be patently unfair to require

the Defendant to continue to make payments when a determination was
made within three months following receipt of the notice of claim
that no coverage existed.

Harding, supra.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
This Court should uphold that ruling.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/£

day of

K/1 (Zj^-^t*

. 1987.

BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys for
Defendants/Respondents

^INSA L.W. ROTH
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M. Hatch, Christensen, Jensen & Powell, 175 South West Temple, #510,
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